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Introduction             
Project Background 
This project examines the process by which the United States Navy formulates and implements 
strategy. Strategy is traditionally understood as the linkage of ends, ways, and means to achieve 
specific objectives, while the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms narrows the 
definition to “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a 
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 
objectives.”1 OPNAV’s task, however, is to formulate an organizational strategy that enables the 
Navy to support higher-level policy objectives. This type of strategy ideally should be framed by 
a conceptual analysis of the future security environment and U.S. defense policy.  For OPNAV, 
Navy strategy is transformative in the sense that it offers a plan to create the Navy of tomorrow 
out of the Navy of today. 
 
The prospect of declining budgets and a changing geostrategic environment impose an urgent 
need for a more rigorous ends, ways, and means decision-making cycle when it comes to this 
Navy strategy. Over the next several years, the Navy faces the prospect of building fewer ships 
and airplanes than would be necessary to maintain current fleet size. Without a dramatic change 
in Congressional budgetary politics, the Navy will get smaller over the next quarter century. In 
order to ensure its continued ability to meet defense requirements, the Navy needs to connect its 
organizational strategy to austere budgetary realities as well as to the likelihood of accelerating 
global political, economic and military change. Without a robust attempt to improve its process 
of linking strategy to ends, ways and means, and by operationalizing policy priorities, the Navy 
increases the risk of catastrophic failure in war. This project explores how the Navy’s strategy 
development, planning, and programming processes can be improved to provide Navy leadership 
with a more robust method to link ends, ways, and means together now and in the future. 
 
Critics assert that the Navy’s process of developing strategy is primarily driven by money 
allocated in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to the shipbuilding and aviation budgets. 
Congressman Randy Forbes (R-VA), traditionally a strong ally of the U.S. Navy, recently gave 
voice to such skepticism, stating, “…in recent years we seem to have turned ourselves upside 
down by increasingly emphasizing programs and force structure rather than starting with a 
strategy based on what we need naval forces to do and in what scenarios.”2 
 
Instead of making programming and budgetary decisions on the basis of a systematic assessment 
of the future security environment, these decisions are heavily weighted by past practice and                                                         1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 8 November  2010 (as 
amended through 15 March 2015), 234. 
2 Sam LaGrone, “Randy Forbes to CNO Greenert: ‘The Navy Desperately Needs a Strategy,’” USNI News, 1 
October 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/10/01/randy-forbes-cno-greenert-navy-desperately-needs-strategy. 
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institutional interests that seek to preserve the missions and platforms associated with cherished 
ship and aircraft programs – both of which constitute the core and bedrock of naval institutional 
identity. While based on a rigorous assessment of force structure resiliency in anticipated near-
term scenarios, the existing Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, 
only inspires marginal changes over existing programs. The force structure of today’s Navy is 
the result of decisions made more than a quarter century ago due to the long life cycle of its ships 
– decisions that were made in a very different global environment. Some analysts argue that the 
Navy’s commitment to these legacy platforms has become divorced from a realistic 
understanding of the changed strategic environment – changes that are indifferent to platform life 
cycles.  Worse yet, the conceptual definition and multi-year planning rigidities of PPBE ensures 
that changes in money today will not be felt in the Fleet for 5 years.   
 
In order to understand the Navy’s current strategy development processes and mechanisms, this 
study examined a wide variety of intra- and inter-organizational relationships among different 
stakeholders that play a role in developing strategy and plans for the Navy. The research team 
analyzed the OPNAV staff structure and the impact that the intra-bureaucratic balance of power 
within that staff plays in the strategy development process. For illustrative purposes, the study 
team also analyzed how the other military departments manage the process of developing and 
translating strategy into plans and budgets to determine if there are insights that the Navy could 
use to build a more robust process.  
  
There is a rich literature on the development of strategy in the fields of history and political 
science, particularly on the impact of organizational and bureaucratic behavior on strategy 
development. In Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow address the role of 
bureaucratic politics in shaping state behavior, arguing that organizational bargaining and 
interaction play a profound role in producing policy outputs. In the security studies literature, 
authors Barry Posen, Stephen Peter Rosen, and Deborah Avant propose different explanatory 
models of organizational behavior in the development of strategies to protect the state.3 There is 
also an emerging literature that analyzes the impact of bottom-up change in military 
organizations as a source of organizational innovation. James Russell’s recent work Military 
Adaptation in Afghanistan, co-edited with Theo Farrell and Frans Osinga, and Innovation, 
Transformation and War: US Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, 
Iraq, 2005-2007, highlights the myriad sources of innovation and change in military 
organizations that include bottom up pressures.4 This literature was drawn upon in developing                                                         3 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military 
Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
4 Theo Farrell, Frans P. B. Osinga, and James A. Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2013); James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency 
Operations in Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
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assumptions to examine the process of developing national strategy and the Navy’s translation of 
that strategy into plans, programs, and budgets. 
Project Objectives 
• Examine, describe, and analyze the planning processes currently used by the Navy to 
develop and execute strategy, and the role played by N3/N5 in that process. 
• Examine, describe and analyze how the Navy currently operationalizes the prospect of 
future economic, political, and military uncertainty as an input in the strategy 
development, planning, and budgetary process.  
• Examine the organizational relationship among various Navy stakeholders in the strategy 
development process, including OPNAV, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War 
College, and naval components of the combatant commands.  
• Propose ways that relationships between these stakeholders can be improved to support 
the N3/N5 role in developing strategy and translating plans into budgets that are more 
responsive to policy priorities. 
• Review, describe, and analyze the Army and Air Force’s strategy development, planning, 
and budgetary processes and what insights the practices of these sister services might 
offer to the Navy.   
 
Project Approach and Methods 
This study approached the Navy’s problem in developing and executing strategy via three 
primary avenues: (1) a practical assessment of the formal and informal processes by which the 
Navy interprets and develops organizational strategies and plans, builds, and funds its programs; 
(2) a comparison with other services’ strategy development experiences; and (3) a historical 
analysis of previous periods of strategic disarray within the Navy. The team considered such 
issues as: the disconnect between changes in the security environment and acquisition cycles; the 
impact of domestic policy on service budget priorities; the role of intra-service rivalries in the 
strategy and budget execution process; the overriding impact of the nation’s economic health that 
often limits the amount of money available for service budgets; and, the impact that unforeseen 
global events can have on strategy and operations. 
 
To meet the project objectives, the study team collected data from: (1) secondary source 
reporting and public documents on the previously referenced issues: (2) primary source 
documents internal to the services; and (3) information and perspectives from different 
organizational stakeholders through on-site visits to the Navy offices and commands involved in 
the development of strategy. The data collected was qualitative in nature. The information 
collected from these three sources provided the research team with the basis to reach supportable 
generalizations about the issues being investigated in this project.  
 




1. Today’s Navy suffers from a strategy deficit.  
The Navy lacks a process to generate robust thought and debate on the future geostrategic 
environment upon which to base decisions on the shape, composition, and size of its 
force structure. As a result, the Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy 
priorities drive programmatic development and execution.   
 
2. Programming and budgeting eclipses strategy and policy. 
Within the OPNAV organization, programming and budgeting in the POM/PPBE process 
eclipses strategy and planning – indeed, the programming process is substituted for, and 
is often equated to, strategy. Policy priorities play little direct role in the organization’s 
attempt to match ends, ways, and means to a broader vision of the geostrategic 
environment. Purported strategy documents like Cooperative Seapower for the 21st 
Century and its many predecessors serve as principal-agent/budgeting documents 
designed to market the institution to Congress in order to secure funding. Strategy 
documents are largely disconnected from any strategic planning process, although the 
“Navy Strategic Enterprise” initiative is attempting to tackle this problem. On the 
OPNAV staff, the N81 wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it 
comes to the making and implementation of strategy. N3/N5 in general, and the N51 in 
particular, are not empowered, staffed, nor organized to play a meaningful role in strategy 
development and execution.  
  
3. The Navy’s strategic planning processes are inconsistent.  
N51, and therefore OPNAV, lacks the power and ability to translate policies, priorities, or 
instructions to inform strategy development and planning. The processes that exist are 
anemic, ad hoc and personality driven. As a result, programs are largely unconnected to 
policy-endorsed assessments of long-term political trends and the future geostrategic 
environment. 
 
4. OPNAV’s processes and structures vary notably from the other services’. 
A comparison to the Army and the Air Force efforts to ensure that policy priorities and 
strategy drives programming revealed the extent to which OPNAV’s processes and 
structure are at variance with the other services. Indeed, in the current uncertain 
budgetary environment, the Army and the Air Force have taken initiatives to strengthen 
existing planning tools to ensure that strategy and policy drive programming, budgeting 
and execution. 
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5. There are deep historical roots to the Navy’s strategy deficit. 
The Navy’s current strategy deficit has deep historic roots in the experiences of the 
institution that date back to creation of the service in the early days of the republic. 
History suggests that that the Navy goes through periods of stagnation and regeneration 
that are linked to its experiences in war.   As Navy strategy and force structures reaches 
operational maturity, events often transpire to render it technologically, strategically or 
politically obsolete.  
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1: The Navy’s Strategy Deficit    
The Navy lacks a process to generate robust thought and debate on the future geostrategic 
environment upon which to base decisions on the shape, composition, and size of its force 
structure. As a result, the Navy has failed to ensure that strategy drives program development 
and execution.  
Organizational Challenges 
The Navy today suffers from what could be characterized as a profound strategy deficit. Strategy 
per se is not an institutional value in the Navy. Institutional leadership is neither educated, nor 
trained, to think about and operationalize strategy – an observation behind the recent “Navy 
Strategic Enterprise” initiative. Rather, the Navy values operational experience and competent 
program management above all. A recent study of the Navy’s senior leadership in the post-Cold 
War by Peter Haynes supports this over-arching conclusion.5 According to Haynes, the Navy’s 
senior leaders over the last 50 years have been uniformly selected for their expertise in their 
operational communities, combined with their abilities to manage programs and budgets. The 
Navy places little institutional emphasis on the educational and intellectual development of its 
officer corps beyond operational matters. While numerous opportunities exist for promising 
junior officers to pursue higher education, shore tours to complete degrees in strategic studies or 
the social sciences at institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, 
and outside civilian universities, are not considered to be career enhancing. Because officers will 
not receive an observed fitness report (FITREP), and might have to deviate from ideal career 
paths, these educational opportunities have often been painted as undesirable by detailers and 
senior leaders when counseling junior officers with promising careers.  
 
The Navy’s institutional focus on technocratic and bureaucratic skills in its senior management 
finds is most dramatic expression in the intra-bureaucratic power distribution in the OPNAV 
staff. It is a commonly accepted fact (as reflected in the data collected in this study) that the N8 
is the most bureaucratically powerful element in the Navy. Most senior leaders in the Navy have 
done tours in these organizations as they climb up the organizational hierarchy. While some 
senior leaders have also spent time in the N3/N5, these tours tend to be short and are geared 
toward familiarizing admirals with the N3/operations side. Few admirals stay long enough in the 
position to create significant changes in the organization or to garner greater institutional weight 
vis-à-vis the other N-codes.   The revolving door of senior uniformed leaders through the N3/N5 
position weakens the clout of the organization in the OPNAV intra-bureaucratic balance of 
power. 
 
                                                        
5 Peter D. Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a 
Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 
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In certain respects, the Navy’s cultivation of an analytically oriented leadership group with little 
background in strategy represents a logical institutional response to the demands placed on it by 
its civilian masters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its patrons in Congress. The 
Navy, like all the services, is principally responsible for manning, training and equipping the 
force, and to then provide that force for use by the combatant commands, which will deploy that 
force as directed by the President/Secretary of Defense. This immense responsibility places a 
premium on programmatic, managerial, and operational expertise – an enterprise of unimagined 
complexity. The Navy has (and continues to) produce senior leaders that have mastered their 
tasks in these required competencies. Given this overarching priority, it could be argued that 
Navy leadership necessarily regards strategy per se as of secondary importance to the man, train, 
and equip function.  
 
Domestic Challenges  
It also could be argued that the Navy’s strategy deficit is a function of an organization that is not 
actually required to do strategy. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, assigned the task of developing long range plans for war 
fighting to empowered combatant commanders responsible for different geographic regions of 
the world. Under the management system created by Goldwater-Nichols, the services became 
force providers to the combatant commanders, whose demands would be coordinated by the 
Joint Staff with greater authorities. Importantly, Goldwater-Nichols also elevated the stature and 
authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff to bring some level of managerial 
order to the services’ budgets, plans, and programs. Without responsibility for deliberate 
planning based on potential war scenarios tied to geopolitical assessments, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the Navy instead valued operational and managerial expertise in its leaders.  
Nevertheless, the fact that OPNAV is responsible for manning, training and equipping the 
current, as well as the future Navy highlights the central role of strategy in informing decisions 
that will shape the Navy twenty or thirty years from today. 
 
Another contributing factor to the Navy’s strategy deficit is the lack of consistent and clear 
strategic direction, supported by authoritative budgetary authority, provided by the civilian 
masters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Executive Branch. Stated differently, 
the Navy’s strategy deficit is a function of the nation’s strategy deficit. The increasingly 
dysfunctional system of strategy formulation and development in the national command 
authority over the last quarter century constitutes a powerful contributing factor in the Navy’s 
challenge with developing its organizational strategy.  
 
Throughout much of the 20th century, the Cold War provided civilian leadership across the 
political spectrum with a series of commonly held assumptions around which to base strategy. 
This shared framework was provided to and accepted by the military services, which they used to 
develop supporting plans, policies, and programs. During the Cold War, Republican and 
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Democratic administrations pursued a relatively consistent security strategy, since both parties 
essentially agreed on the need to counter Soviet military power. With the end of the Cold War, 
however, the common intellectual center of gravity for strategy gradually unraveled as the 
civilian leadership migrated to major regional contingencies as scenarios upon which to base 
strategy and policy during the 1990s.  
 
The 9/11 attacks presaged a new era in which collapsing states and violent non-state actors came 
to be seen as the primary threats to national security.  The era also saw the collapse of domestic 
political consensus, with sequestration being only the latest manifestation of the inability of the 
country to govern via consensus. The subsequent land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan both 
occurred in an intellectual strategic vacuum created by the new, amorphous “Global War on 
Terror.” Prosecuting the wars, even in a support role as the Navy did, consumed an immense 
amount of institutional energy that left less attention to engage in long-range planning and 
strategy.  
 
The post-9/11 period also saw the rise of capabilities-based planning. Civilian leaders directed 
the military departments to develop capabilities packages that were not linked to a specific 
adversary or threat, but would instead be available in a plug-and-play fashion for any 
contingency. These capabilities packages bore little relationship to broader assessments of the 
strategic environment. Indeed, capabilities-based defense planning serves as a metaphor for the 
overall lack of authority to direct strategy in the civilian secretariat, which consciously refused to 
set priorities to guide strategy and defense planning. The descent into intellectual strategic 
incoherence at the national-level mirrored the breakdown in domestic political consensus that 
finds its most recent manifestation in sequestration. Given this wider domestic context, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that today’s Navy suffers from a strategy deficit.  
 
Technological Challenges 
The Navy’s difficulty in engaging in long-range strategic thinking is partially explained by the 
systemically-complicated nature and lifespan of its principal platform – the surface ship. Trying 
to synchronize thinking about potential futures with platforms that boast a 40-50 year lifespan is 
a difficult proposition. Ships last a long time, particularly nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It is 
a certainty that the world and the geostrategic environment will change over 50+ years, but it is 
admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to define these changes with any degree of precision 
sufficient to guide platform evolution. As a result, the Navy has managed its thinking about the 
future for these platforms by integrating new technologies onto its platforms to improve such 
things as the performance of its sensors, communications, speed, weapons accuracy, and a host 
of other capabilities. One result of this phenomenon is that Navy platforms have undergone 
iterative changes over their lifetimes, changes principally driven by advances in technology that 
may satisfy those seeking metrics that demonstrate “capabilities” but which may or not be related 
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to long-range trends in the strategic environment.  It is also disturbing to note that these 
incremental changes have not been tested in especially challenging combat environments.  
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2: Programming and Budgeting Eclipses Strategy and Policy  
Within the OPNAV organization, programming and budgeting in the Program Objective 
Memoranda/Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (POM/PPBE) process eclipses 
strategy and planning – indeed, the programming process is substituted for, and is often equated 
to, strategy. Policy priorities play little direct role in the organization’s attempt to match ends, 
ways, and means to a broader vision of the geostrategic environment. Purported strategy 
documents like Cooperative Seapower for the 21st Century (CS21) and its many predecessors 
serve as principal-agent/ aspirational documents designed to market the institution to Congress 
in order to secure funding, as opposed to providing clear budgetary priorities. On the OPNAV 
staff, the N81 and the N1 wield most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power. N3/N5 in 
general and the N51 in particular are not empowered, staffed, nor organized to play a 
meaningful role in strategy development and execution.  
 
CNO Admiral Vernon Clark, who served from 2000-2005, once claimed that the Navy’s strategy 
was its Program Objective Memorandum (POM).6 Admiral Clark only voiced what is today the 
prevalent view throughout the OPNAV staff.7 The annual process to build the Navy’s input to 
the President’s Budget is arguably the single most important bureaucratic function of the 
OPNAV staff – and it is a process that is only tangentially shaped by strategy. Indeed, the 
Navy’s strategy deficit sees its fullest expression in the realities of OPNAV’s Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara initially created the PPBE system to aggregate what until that point had been 
completely independent budgetary processes in each of the military departments. 8  Through 
PPBE and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the Department of Defense oversees 
with limited authorities the allocation of resources among the services, which continue to enjoy 
budgetary independence. It aims to achieve the optimal mix of forces, manpower, material, 
equipment, and support to meet the civilian leadership’s objectives.  
 
PPBE in OPNAV 
Within OPNAV, the PPBE process is separated into four phases. The first phase, Strategy and 
Planning, is broken down into the development of three products: Strategic Guidance (N51); 
Front-End Assessment (primarily completed by N81); and Planning Guidance (N80). Once the 
guidance has been developed, the Planning phase is completed, and the Programming phase 
kicks off. During this phase, assets are assigned to meet identified missions and priorities, and 
programs are integrated to identify mission shortfalls and duplication of efforts. The Budgeting                                                         
6 Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” p. 227-228. 
7 This view was expressed throughout the OPNAV offices canvassed by the study team (2014). 
8 See, Charles Johnston Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965; and, 
Charles Johnston Hitch, et al., The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, New York, Athenum, 1975. 
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phase is then conducted by N80, which is responsible for producing an annual budget that links 
missions and programs to the funding request. The final phase, Execution, is the actual 
expenditure of funds; this phase was outside the scope of this study. 
 
Through the PPBE process, the Navy analyzes and articulates its potential future operational 
needs of the fleet. Since the introduction of PPBE, the Navy has placed the N8, Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources, in the role of refereeing the intra-bureaucratic competition for 
money, which has given that directorate outsized intra-bureaucratic power. While the current 
PPBE process successfully allocates money in the Navy budget as required, the study team found 
that programming decisions are neither driven nor greatly influenced by long-range thinking 
about the future geostrategic environment provided by the N3/N5 – assuming N51 provides any 
strategic guidance at all. In reality, the N3/N5 plays little direct role either at the outset of the 
annual process, or as it unfolds throughout the fiscal year. As noted later in this report, this 
practice is at variance with the Air Force and Army, which consciously attempt to make their 
respective strategy organizations centrally involved in program management throughout the 
entire execution phase of the POM.  
 
The Role of the N8 
The strength of the N8 can be seen in the actions taken by successive CNOs with programming 
backgrounds, who have empowered the N8 and have moved responsibilities to that directorate 
from the N5. In effect, the N8 creates its own guidance as it “owns” both the data derived from 
campaign analysis, which can be used to justify the priorities that it has determined (and by 
extension, dismantle other arguments), as well as “owning” the budget. In effect, it grades its 
own homework.  In the last two years, absent any guidance from N51, N80 had documented 
priorities as “tenets,” with three different lists of tenets based on the type of budget being 
produced. There are inherent weaknesses in such insularity, however; for example, the N81 
modeling future threats have come under criticism for their force-on-force orientation, with little 
political nuance such as basing rights and other diplomatic sensitivities. Nevertheless, key 
planning documents, such as the 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan, not only do not reference any N5 
guidance, but are developed in the N9 with heavy N8 involvement; N51 is not engaged during 
the process in any substantial way. These documents become justifications of shipbuilding for 
shipbuilding’s sake, with little attention paid to the strategic effects desired.  
  
No less a programming legacy in OPNAV than CAPT (ret.) Arthur “Tripp” Barber has stated 
that the current planning and management practices of OPNAV need a fundamental rethinking. 
In a 2014 Proceedings article, Barber noted that, “At present projected budget levels, if we 
continue our current processes for setting the design requirements of future ships and aircraft, the 
service’s size will shrink over the next two decades to about two-thirds of today’s force-structure 
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goals of 306 ships and 3,000 aircraft.”9 Added impetus to the need to rethink the role of policy 
and planning in informing OPNAV’s N8 programming directorate is the potential for  
Sequestration. When added to the anticipated $4 billion shortfall in the Navy’s 30 Year 
Shipbuilding Program,10 Tripp Barber’s assessments may be optimistic.11  
 
In addition to the growth of the N8, several other policy and planning-related initiatives 
undertaken by CNOs have occurred at the expense of the N5. The billets necessary to create 
N00Z were taken out of the N5. Many initiatives that should have been undertaken by the 
directorate were placed in ad hoc bodies, such as Deep Blue, the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, 
and others. A recent example of the N5’s relatively weak position within OPNAV came with the 
latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was run on the OPNAV staff by the N8. 
  
The unenviable situation in which the N5 finds itself, vis-à-vis other OPNAV directorates, is a 
function of the ambivalence of successive senior naval leaders to the need for the staff to possess 
a strong institutional planning capability. Traditionally, the CNO Sailing Directions have not 
been developed by or staffed through the N5, but rather have been done in the N00Z. According 
to Peter Swartz and Karin Duggan, the VCNO’s PLANORDS for the development of the POM 
ignored the inputs of the Navy’s strategic planning process.12  
 
To its credit, N51 in the past has made a number of attempts to get in front of the N8 and provide 
planning guidance    particularly since the tenure of CNO Admiral Mike Mullen.13 The record of 
effectiveness of its key planning document, however, the Naval Strategic Plan, or NSP, is mixed. 
There have been some notable successes, such as NSP12. This document was generally 
considered useful, and N5 subsequently participated actively in the POM-build. This may have 
been partially attributable to the fact that the N81 assisted in the development of the document’s 
risk matrix, which was informed by fiscal realities.14 Nevertheless, the NSP has experienced                                                         
9  Arthur H. Barber, III, “Rethinking the Future Fleet,” Proceedings Magazine 140, no. 5 (May 2014). 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-05/rethinking-future-fleet.  The fact that the aviators of 2035 will 
be driven by their automobiles to their aircraft should give the reader pause about Barber’s vision of future Navy 
force structure. 
10 Harry Kazianis, “The A2/AD Challenge: Interview with Rep. J. Randy Forbes,” Real Clear Defense, February 23, 
2015, 
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/23/the_a2ad_challenge_interview_with_rep_j_randy_forbes.html 
11 For a recent and sober assessment of the financial outlook for the Navy see Ronald O’Rourke, “Naval Force 
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” RL32665, Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 24 February 2015.  
12 According to Swartz and Duggan, the VCNO’s PLANORDS for the development of the POM ignored the inputs 
of the Navy’s strategic planning process. See Peter Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and 
Concepts (2001-2010: Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents), Alexandria, Center for Naval Analysis, 
2011, p. 319. 
13 For a comprehensive description and analysis of OPNAV planning initiatives see, Swartz with Duggan, U.S. Navy 
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010.  
14 CDR Steve Kelley, USN, “Linking Strategy to POM Development: The Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM-
12 (NSP-12),” undated unclassified briefing, slide #6. 
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numerous difficulties since its inception in 2006. A severe critique offered by a former senior 
official in N8 is that N51 guidance simply stated, at best, that which the N8 was already planning 
to do; and at worse, that the document’s prose was too expansive and did not differentiate 
between what had to be done very well, and what capabilities could be done just good enough. 
NSP14 was never endorsed by the CNO, and for FY16, N5 did not develop an NSP at all. 
Further, NSPs have often been ignored by other OPNAV directorates. One partial explanation 
for this uneven record is that as OPNAV (like the rest of the Department of Defense) struggled to 
manage planning and execution during the uncertainties created by sequestration, particularly 
when POM builds became an annual rather than biannual mandate. The process to create the 
NSP simply could not keep up with events and the timeline to create the POM. Even absent 
sequestration, however, the N51’s planning documents are likely to have been only marginally 
useful. Without greater specificity to provide precise financial guidance to the N8 in order to 
inform the development of the POM, N51’s planning guidance has little value.  
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3: Inconsistent Strategic Planning Processes   
The Navy lacks clear policies, guidance, or instructions for strategy development and planning. 
The processes that exist are ad hoc and personality driven. As a result, programs are largely 
unconnected to assessments of long-term political trends and the future geostrategic 
environment.  
The Navy lacks a formalized strategic planning process, which creates a yawning gap between 
high-level national strategy and the implementation of plans, programs and policies. There is no 
Department of the Navy-established policy or guidance sanctioning this essential activity, unlike 
the other two Military Departments15 or the Joint Staff.16 While the Navy leadership sees the 
need for a formal instruction to conduct force structure assessments, it is unconcerned with 
creating a process to use such reviews in a comprehensive planning process.17 This has not 
always been the case.  A review of post-war history makes clear that all Navy Secretaries or 
CNOs have not accepted this state of affairs. There have been a series of intermittent attempts to 
exert control over planning and priorities, such the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.  In the main, 
however, these efforts have proven episodic with only limited success.   
 
N51’s Ad Hoc Strategic Planning 
As noted by the offices canvassed in this study, OPNAV’s N3/N5, specifically the N51, exert 
inconsistent and insufficient influence over the Navy’s programming and budgeting activities in 
the PPBE and play little role in strategy formulation and development. The N3/N5 and the N51 
in particular has yet to build an effective and repeatable means of developing and conveying 
policy guidance and financial priorities to N8.18 This is not a new problem. For several years, 
N51 produced the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), which was given to the N81 before the Front End 
Assessment in order to provide some sense of long-term priorities and guidance. However, no 
NSP has been completed in the last three years, and though there are plans to replace it with a 
Classified Annex to the new CS21, that has not yet happened. Perhaps because of its 
understrength and lack of long historical expertise as a staff, the N5 directorate has struggled to 
produce guidance in time, and in sufficient detail to drive the POM development process. 
 
                                                        
15 Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, Army Regulation (AR) 1-1; and, Strategic Planning 
System: Air Force Policy Directive 90-11. 
16 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Planning System, CJCSI 3100.01B, 12 December 2008.  
17 Force Structure Assessments, OPNAVINST 3050.27, N81, 12 February 2015.  
18 According to Rosenberg, this is an outcome of the Navy’s institutional consensus-driven and multi-layered policy 
making process that produces “strategy” as a reflection of the institution, as opposed to senior leadership. David A. 
Rosenberg, “American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War: An Inquiry in the Structure and Process of 
General War at Sea, 1945–90,” by N. A. M. Rodger, ed., Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, New York, 
Macmillan, 1996, p. 243. 
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In some respects, this is an organizational and human capital problem. The N51 has traditionally 
been a very small directorate (approximately 15), staffed manly with junior officers. It lacks a 
cadre of long-serving civilians to provide strategic maturity, institutional memory, and 
continuity; turnover among civilian staff has been high in recent years. The staff assigned to the 
N3/N5 and the N51 often lack the educational background and expertise to guide and participate 
in the budget-requirements driven work on the PPBE coordinated out of the N8. An observation 
of the N51 staffing was that billets are typically filled one-down (i.e. an O6 billet is filled with an 
O5, etc.). The lack of staff experience in OPNAV puts N5 action officers at a disadvantage vis-à-
vis their N8 counterparts, many of whom have done several tours in the directorate. A commonly 
heard anecdote related the story of an N51 O-6 who began a meeting by noting that he had never 
done strategy before – hardly a reassuring statement. 
 
Additionally, most of the other N-code directorates have a civilian deputy to provide continuity. 
By contrast, the deputy in N3/N5 is an admiral, which generates substantial churn, especially 
given that jobs in this directorate frequently seem to be short-term assignments on an upward 
career path. Most senior admirals in the N3/N5 are not in the job long enough to figure out what 
the directorate is supposed to be doing, and have little vested interest in challenging the intra-
OPNAV dominance of the N8.  
 
The Navy’s Fractured Strategic Thought Community 
The Navy’s difficulty in creating a robust strategic planning organization in its N5 is echoed in 
the fractured and incoherent nature of the Navy’s strategic thought community. Many different 
Navy and quasi-Navy organizations (the Center for Naval Analyses) believe they have a role in 
strategy, yet no attempt is made to harness and coordinate the substantial intellectual horsepower 
in organizations like the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, Deep Blue, N00Z, 
and other organizations.  The “Strategic Enterprise Initiative,” which was beginning when the 
bulk of the research for this report was conducted, seems to be making modest progress in 
creating a community of strategists in the Navy. 
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4: OPNAV’s Processes and Structures Vary Notably from the 
Other Services           
Comparisons to the Army and the Air Force efforts to improve strategy development, planning, 
and budgeting revealed the extent to which OPNAV’s processes and structure are frankly 
archaic when compared to the other services. Indeed, the Army and the Air Force are developing 
organizational and management structures, philosophies and planning tools to reinforce that 
strategy and policy drive programming, budgeting and execution.  
An analysis of OPNAV’s version of PPBE demonstrates that it is significantly different from its 
Military Department counterparts. A comparative analysis of the three PPBE systems employed 
by the three Military Departments demonstrated that OPNAV’s practices are highly centralized 
and isolated from policy priorities. Decision-making is centered in only a few officials, and there 
is a lack of coordination, let alone consensus building.19 Indeed, a comparison of the other two 
Military Department’s PPBE demonstrates that the N8 enjoys a unique degree of freedom from 
policy and planning priorities. Moreover, unlike the Army and Air Force staffs, the N8 engages 
in a high degree of “force management” responsibilities that are resident in lower commands in 
the other Military Departments. This organizational arrangement produces what can be best 
described as “strategic budgeting,” which limits the impact of policy guidance and resource 
priorities, even when issued by the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO. Perhaps the current 
programming system is optimal in that it responds effectively to the fleet’s requirements today, 
but it must be acknowledged that this system isolates financing from policy priorities.  
 
No better means of testing this assertion is by comparing the current OPNAV process to that of 
its other Service counterparts.  
 
Department of the Army 
Contrary to the domination of OPNAV by the N8, the Department of the Army’s G3/5/7 has the 
dominate role in producing, and thereafter managing, the Army Staff’s strategic planning 
process. In terms of guidance, The Army Plan (“The TAP”) actually consists of four separate, 
but closely inter-related, documents that are produced annually in accordance with a formal 
policy that outlines the process, i.e., the Army’s Planning Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution System.20 Note that like the Air Force (vide infra), in light of a more challenging 
financial environment, the TAP has recently undergone revisions in order to enable Army 
                                                        
19 Tiffany F. Hill, “An Analysis of the Organizational Structures Supporting PPPB within the Military 
Departments,” M.A. Thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008, pp. 100; 113. 
20 Secretary of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 1-1, 9 July 1986. To be revised in light of revisions to The Army 
Plan (TAP). 
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leadership to focus attention on planning, vice programming, and provide clearer guidance to 
financial decision-making.21 Current and envisaged key strategic planning documents include:  
 
 
• Army Vision (to be co-authored as required by the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief 
of Staff’s offices. “The AV articulates the desired end state of the Secretary and Chief of 
Staff, Army over a 10 year time horizon; at once, both challenging the Army and 
providing a ‘touchstone’ to drive future change…. It is the source document to which all 
other sections of the revised TAP are tethered, and serves as the central document from 
which all other strategic communication documents…emanate.” 
 
• Army Strategic Planning Guidance (developed biennially by G3/5/7, Strategic Plans and 
Policy Directorate). This document was the Army’s institutional strategic framework. 
The document is drafted to look out 10-20 years, analyze the emerging geostrategic 
world, and identifies the Army’s objectives and initiates the process of creating priorities. 
This guidance document will be retired after FY 17-21 POM build.  It will be replaced by 
both the Army vision, as well as by Army Strategic Plan. 
 
• Army Strategic Plan (developed every four years; reviewed every two years, by G3/5/7, 
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate). This document will replace the Army Strategic 
Planning Guidance, after FY 17-21 POM build. “The purpose of the ASP…is to 
articulate a strategy that directs how the Army will fulfill its Title 10 responsibilities and 
additional statutory requirements over a 10 year time horizon…The ASP serves as the 
key linkage between strategy and budget and informs the Army’s annual planning efforts 
as part of the PPBE.”  
 
• Army Planning Guidance (developed annually by G3/5/7, Strategic Plans and Policy 
Directorate). “The new planning document is envisaged to enhance “its focus on planning 
vs. prioritization and will replace the [APPG].” This new document is envisaged to 
initiate the PPBE process and will have the task of identifying and providing more 
detailed guidance to guide key planning issues, all of which is needed before the POM 
build is completed.  
 
• Army Planning Priorities Guidance (was developed annually by G3/5/7, Resource 
Analysis and Integration Office, but will be retired and replaced by the Army Planning 
Guidance). The “APPG” was developed to address the mid-term planning period of next 
6-year POM, plus 5-7 additional years. The document’s purpose has been to provide 
additional detail to the Army Strategic Planning Guidance. Of importance is its objective                                                         
21 See Department of the Army, “Revisions to The Army Plan,” 16 October 2014. Note that this memorandum was 
signed both by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. 
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of identifying and creating a priority of current and envisaged operational capabilities. 
The document included risk guidance to guide planners that is based, inter alia, in 
accordance with the QDR. 
 
• Army Program Guidance Memorandum (developed annually by G8, Program Analysis 
and Evaluation Directorate). The APGM plays the critical role of linking required 
operational capabilities with programming. The document provides guidance for officials 
developing their individual Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) and provides a continuum 
of guidance from mid-term planning to programming. In other words, the APGM 
translates operational undertakings to resource tasks, i.e., the alignment of strategy, 
missions and priorities from Army Vision, Army Strategic Plan, and Army Planning 
Guidance with other guidance from OSD in building the POM. 
 
• Army Campaign Plan (developed semi-annually by G3/5/7, Army’s Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations and Plans). The Army Campaign Plan can be best described as 
providing an operational expression of the planning and guidance sections of the TAP, 
i.e., a year-of-execution management tool.22 In the revised TAP, its role is “to establish 
and monitor annual priorities and initiatives from the Secretary and Chief of Staff, Army 
that require measurable end states or decisions in the year of execution.” 
 
The Department of the Army’s approach to managing planning and programming is to produce 
guidance for the force developed via consensus, both at the staff and senior leadership levels of 
the Department. In brief, once the Army Strategic Planning Guidance has been developed, 
staffed, and approved, the G3/5/7 takes the lead in working directly with the G8 to ensure that all 
aspects of the ensuing POM-build remains in conformance with agreed, and approved, guidance. 
In other words, it maintains its involvement in the Army’s PPBE throughout the entire process. 
This is essential to ensure that which drives the system remains the aggregation of priorities 
developed by the G3/5/7. To date, these have not been universally cost-informed, but trends 
point towards this practice gaining greater acceptance. This has been facilitated since the 1990s 
with the opening up the G8 costing data-base. There has yet to be a formal and detailed as cross-
portfolio, or trade-space actions among training, equipping, manning; let alone cost-informed 
risk-tolerance at the programmatic level within G3/5/7, yet trends point to greater acceptance of 
this practice. 
 
This coordination is formalized through a series of regular meeting bringing together the G3/5/7 
and G8 throughout the PPBE process. Specifically, there is a weekly Council of Colonels which 
is co-chaired by the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration Office (G3/5/7); the Chief, 
Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; and Deputy                                                         
22 Howard W. Lord, ed., How Army Runs, 2013-2014: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
U.S. War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 15 July 2013, Chapter 9, p. 11-20.  
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Director of Management and Control, ASA (FM&C). These meetings package proposals, frame 
issues and coordinate the staging of decision-making sessions at the for 2-Star level, i.e., Budget 
and Requirements and Programs Group (BRP), and the Planning Programming and Budgeting 
Committee (PPBC) for issues that cannot be resolved in at the level of Colonels. 
 
From the perspective of the Army Staff, there is little question that the G3/5/7 has responsibility 
for Army-wide prioritization.23 That said, it is a misnomer to perceive the G8 as solely the 
resourcing agent of the army. The directorate’s focus has changed in recent year to become the 
Army’s “equipper,” as witnessed by moving the responsibility of Force Development from the 
G3/5/7 to the G8. No better evidence can be seen in the fact that the Army Campaign Plan that 
directs how funding is to flow is developed under the authority of the G3/5/7. It should not come 
to be a surprise that given these planning and oversight responsibilities that the G3/5/7 is 
significantly larger than that of the G8, i.e., the former is approximately 1000, vice the latter’s 
several hundred personnel. But, Army officials acknowledged that the entire system is premised 
on clear policy objectives stated by the Chief of Staff; otherwise, as one Army official has 
admitted, the G8, de facto, is in charge of “guessing” priorities. The process is disciplined by 
driving priorities to resources; but knowing that without a costed priority, its true value will 
remain elusive. 
 
Department of the Air Force.  
The Air Force, like the Army, has a well-developed planning system that is highly documented 
with responsibilities spread across the Air Force Staff. However, the Air Force’s planning system 
is undergoing significant change and the current policy that outlines the Air Force’s strategic 
planning process24 is under revision. Nevertheless, policy guidance for the new process and 
supporting organization has been issued. 25  Current and envisaged key strategic planning 
documents include:  
 
• Air Force Strategy (developed by the A5/8.) Explains the Air Force’s strategic purpose. 
Issued every 4 years, and reviewed every 2 years. The document has a 30-year horizon 
and includes a Strategic Environment and Threat Assessment, and contains Strategic 
Priorities & Lines of Operation, science, technology, and research focus areas. 
 
                                                        
23 Secretary of the Army, General Order 2012-01, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within 
Headquarters Department of the Army,” http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/go1201.pdf 
24 Strategic Planning System, Air Force Policy Directive 90-11. Note that this policy document is under revision. 
25 “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future,” Washington, DC, Department of the Air Force, July 2014. The 
document outlines how the Air Force is to act, vice what it plans to buy. 
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• Strategic Master Plan (developed by the new A5/8).26 Provides broad guidance, which 
articulates priorities, goals, and objectives to provide a single Air Force Master Plan. The 
plan is financially-informed and articulates how it will spend its budget over 10 years.  
Annexes to the Strategic Master Plan are the Human Capital Development Plan, Strategic 
Posture Plan, and Capabilities Investment Plan. Note that the Annexes are drafted 
biennially and reviewed annually. 
 
• Strategic Planning Guidance (new and drafted by the A5/8, released in 2014). This 
document will be drafted annually to inform Core Function Support Plans, articulate 
planning choices and drive to develop the Approved Planning Force, all with the view of 
driving the development of the POM. 
 
• Air Force Planning Force (drafted by the A8X.) “The Planning Force is a 20-year force 
structure projection [sand chart] organized as an effects-based capability portfolio 
integrating MAJCOM strategic investment plans with a vector towards the Air Force 
Vision and the Strategic Plan. The Planning Force details the capabilities and the 
capacities needed by the Air Force to execute the FPC [Force Planning Construct] 
through the mid- and far-term at low risk. The Planning Force is informed by technology 
and resource projections but is not limited to current fiscal guidance. It sets the baseline 
from which risk is measured when fiscal constraints are applied to the Planning Force.”27 
 
• “Annual Planning and Programming Guidance” (to be retired)28 
 
Notwithstanding this highly integrated and comprehensive system, the Air Force’s PPBE 
essentially broke down during sequestration, thereby demonstrating that it was not sufficiently 
robust to operate effectively in a period of budgetary uncertainties. As a result of this experience, 
the Air Force has made some major changes recently to the management of its PPBE process that 
endeavours to bring the POM-build from the MAJCOMs up to the Air Staff in order to ensure 
that their stated priorities are in conformance with the Department of the Air Force’s endorsed 
strategy and policy priorities. The new system will allow the Air Staff to prioritize decisions that 
look across the Air Force enterprise as a whole, with the objective of militating against 
community parochialism. To achieve this objective, in future, MAJCOMs will not be involved 
with the POM-build, but will be limited to identifying priorities and these MAJCOM priorities 
will be subordinated to the Air Force Strategic Master Plan. Current leadership hopes that by                                                         
26 Sarah Sicard, “Air Force Chief Reveals Parts of the New Master Plan,” National Defense, 16 September 2014. 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1608 
27 Air Force Policy Directive 90-11, “Strategic Planning System,” 26 March 2009, p. 3. 
28 Previously approved by a three-star, in the new system, it will no longer be issued. Criticism of the document 
included that it was vague to the point of being unhelpful. The way A8X approached developing the document was 
consensus-based. This process took too long and it rarely was issued in a timely fashion to influence decision-
making. 
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doing so, they will empower the Air Staff to focus more on policy and strategy, as opposed to 
“chasing” the POM. Thus, the previous A3/5 and A8, and have been reorganized into the new 
A5/8 directorate, ending the status of the A8 as a stand-alone organization managing the strategic 
planning process. The objective of this initiative has been to split both Operations, and Plans and 
Requirements, into the A3/5 and reinforce strategic planning. The new Operations (A3) 
directorate will be stand-alone, while the planning staffs will form a new A5/8 directorate. The 
objective of this reform is to remove the programmers from A5/8 and put them in Secretariat of 
the Air Force/Financial Management (SAF/FM) to help prevent programming requirements from 
overtaking strategy. According to a senior Air Force General Officer, the new planning process 
and organizational structure was needed in order to allow planners to focus on strategy and the 
long-term (i.e., 20 years), vice involving themselves in short-term POM battles.29 By removing 
the programmers from the strategy development process, it is envisaged that the A5/8 will 
produce very specific guidance and better information than in past in order to give them a strong 
strategic framework with which they can make resource decisions. The new A5/8 also includes a 
division dedicated to ensuring that MAJCOMs’ inputs to the POM-building process are 
consistent with the Air Force's Strategic Master Plan. Importantly, it will be augmented with a 
new assessments branch (A5S) that will measure the degree to which priorities approved in the 
Planning Force are reflected in the POM. Air Force planning has the objective that by 
continuing it long-standing practice of using financially-informed assumptions, they will be able 
to look beyond the FYDP and measure future capabilities using constant dollar costs. A key aim 
in this reorganization of staff and responsibilities has been to increase the number of 4-star 
General Office engagement in the process to ensure accountability to endorsed policy priorities. 
A clarification of staff orientation and focus is represented in the following chart, albeit it has 
been recognized that there will be difficulty drawing a clear division of responsibilities between 
Financial Management and the A-5/8. 
 
Department of the Air Force Planning, Programming and Execution Responsibilities 
Financial Management Budgets 2-5 year 
Programming/Financial 
Management 
Programs 6 to 20 years 
A-5/8 Plans 10 to 30 years 
 
 
Comparative Differences with OPNAV’s PPBE Process 
When compared with its Service counterparts, OPNAV’s strategic planning system is 
unquestionably unique in that, almost by design, isolates financial decision-making from policy 
guidance and planning priorities. Notwithstanding the fact that the Army and Air Force’s policy 
and planning systems are sharply dissimilar to that of OPNAV, there are arguably practices                                                         
29 Aaron Mehta, “Lt General Michael Moeller: USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs,” 
DefenseNews, April 24, 2014. 
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employed by the other Services that could be replicated by OPNAV, the better to link financial 
execution to policy guidance and planning priorities. While hardly comprehensive, the following 
practices by the other two services should merit close study and analysis by OPNAV. 
1. OPNAV does not possess a strategic planning policy document, endorsed by the 
Secretary of the Navy, which establishes and outlines the OPNAV planning process and 
assigns respective roles and responsibilities to officials across OPNAV directorates. Both 
the Army and Air Force have established policy that outlines the PPBE progress at the 
Headquarters level and ensures that policy guidance and planning priorities drive their 
respective PPBE. 
2. The Army Staff keeps policy and priorities as expressed in programs within the G-3/5/7 
Resource Analysis and Integration Office in the form of the Army Planning Priorities 
Guidance. The rationale for this document is that it “Links requirements to strategy and 
guides development of resource priorities for operational tasks over the mid-term period 
of the next six-year POM plus 5-7 additional years.” Importantly, it provides additional 
and explanatory details and resource priorities to guide the development of programs and 
budget. It also identifies and establishes priority of enduring operational capabilities 
required to meet those core Army competencies identified in Field Manual 1 (FM 2), The 
Army. Linking Army priorities back to OSD guidance, risk guidance is also provided to 
programmers and budget officials, which is in accord with the QDR Risk Framework.30 
Such an analytical process, therefore, further translates the Army Strategic Planning 
Guidance into more detailed programming priorities that is represented in Section III, the 
Army Programming Guidance Memorandum. The Air Force is creating a new process 
that while organizationally different from the Army Staff, shares the same objective of 
strengthening policy, strategy and planning in its strategic planning process to guide 
resource decision-making. This effort is envisaged to produce a fiscally-constrained 
investment guide that will create a balance between current and future Air Force 
priorities. 
3. According to the Air Staff, it has long used cost-informed planning and the Army Staff is 
evolving to this practice to ensure that its plans are more financially disciplined. 
4. Both the Army and Air Force place importance on the value of cross staff coordination 
meetings to ensure policy priorities are articulated in the POM development process. The 
Army Staff, for instance, holds biweekly meetings that bring the G3/5/7 and the G8 
together throughout the PPBE process (until execution) at the 06 and 08 levels that seeks 
to balance policy priorities and financial realities. Moreover, in order to help bridge the 
gap between policy priorities and budgeting, the G/3/5/7’s Chief of Resource Analysis 
and Integration Branch (G-3) is an 06 who is handpicked for this key post; a qualification 
being the candidate must have a programming background.  
                                                        
30 How the Army Runs, Chapter 9, p. 31. 
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5. The Air Staff is creating a branch in the A5/8 (Strategic Planners) with the objective of 
assessing the degree to which A5/8’s guidance is integrated into the POM, whereas the 
Army’s approach is more a continuous assessment.  
Therefore, it is a clear priority in both of these MILDEPS is either to develop a new (Air Force), 
or maintain existing (Army) procedures to ensure a continuous policy continuum as the POM is 
developed, with planners using strategy in the lead, thereby leaving their respective programmers 
to optimize budget execution. 
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5: Historic Cycles in Navy Strategy      
       
The Navy’s current strategy deficit has deep historic roots in the experiences of the institution 
that date back to creation of the service in the early days of the republic. History suggests that 
that the Navy goes through periods of stagnation and regeneration that are linked to its 
experiences in war. 
 
The long era of expanding U.S. defense-budgets from 2002 until 2010 unfolded with much 
debate over the best ways to employ Naval forces in the Global War on Terror and in the effort 
to create stability in Iraq. As the United States emerged from the decade-long campaign to 
eliminate Osama bin Laden and to crush al-Qaeda, however, Navy leaders discovered that the 
international and domestic political landscape had changed. Demobilization and austerity, 
highlighted by sequestration of the Department of Defense budget, now loomed large in 
American domestic politics. On the international scene, new events – the endurance of 
international terrorism, the 2011 “pivot to Asia,” and the revival of war in Europe in 2014 – and 
new technological challenges – cyber warfare, robotics, and a host of more exotic “disruptive 
technologies” – posed a challenge to Naval concepts and operations. Navy leaders agreed that 
the time was ripe for a renewed emphasis on Naval Strategy. The result was the recent release of 
the long-awaited revision of the Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, a 
timely and much-needed response to the challenges facing Naval commanders as they 
contemplate the changing strategic environment.  The fact that the new Cooperative Strategy was 
backstopped by the “Navy Strategic Enterprise Initiative,” intended to foster the active 
consideration and use of strategy within OPNAV, highlights the fact that strategy has found a 
new importance among senior Navy officers.  
 
The creation of this new Naval Strategy was no small accomplishment. Today, Navy strategists 
find themselves in a rather difficult situation when it comes to devising and explaining the way 
Naval forces contribute to national defense. During the last quarter century, the Office of 
Secretary of Defense transferred the making of maritime strategy from the OPNAV staff to the 
Combatant Commanders who became the center of gravity of U.S. strategy and operations. In 
the twenty-five years since the eclipse of the Reagan-Lehman Maritime Strategy, the Navy’s 
strategists found themselves left to defend, as opposed to driving, budget priorities and 
construction programs. Nevertheless, if the combatant commanders are focused on current 
operations, OPNAV must not only identify emerging trends and threats, but also find ways to 
change the course of the Navy to meet the challenges and opportunities of the decades ahead. 
Naval strategy, as undertaken by the OPNAV staff, is all about the future, and the future Navy. 
Although Navy strategy must be seen to meet the demands of the day, it will only come to 
complete fruition when the future force envisioned by today’s Naval strategists meets some 
future test in combat. 
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Newcomers to the process of developing Navy strategy might not realize that Navy strategy runs 
in cycles characterized by stasis, crisis and reform. Indeed, during pivotal moments in the past, 
the development of naval and maritime strategy has erupted in inter-service and intra-service 
fights over the budget and preferred weapons, as well as preferred concepts of combined and 
joint strategy. These debates usually end when some international crisis tips the balance in one 
direction or another, as decisions are made to reorient the Navy to meet new operational 
challenges or international threats. Indeed, these cycles are more or less as old as the Navy itself. 
The question that comes to mind, however, is exactly where are we when it comes to this pattern 
of stasis, crisis and reform? 
 
Four Cycles 
Although dividing the history of U.S. Navy strategy into periods is a somewhat arbitrary 
enterprise, four broad periods of stasis, crisis and reform can be identified that highlight a pattern 
in the development of Naval strategy and the institution’s response to technological, operational 
or political change. The first cycle occurred between 1812 and 1880, a period that often appears 
as a dark age following the growth of the Navy in the Civil War and the rise to prominence of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and his works. The second cycle, from 1919 until 1941, begins with the 
ambiguous role of the new U.S. battle fleet in the First World War through the disarmament and 
naval limits of the interwar period and ends with the beginning of mobilization that transpired 
before Pearl Harbor. The third cycle, from 1946 until about 1960, is characterized by inter-
service fights over the role of nuclear weapons in national defense and the part the Navy would 
play in deterring nuclear war. The fourth cycle, which transpired between 1970 until 1980, 
illustrates the crisis in Naval affairs that the led to the Reagan-Lehman 600-ship Navy program 
that re-coupled the Navy to the general effort to respond to Soviet global ambitions. 
 
The Dark Age: 1865–1880 
The phenomenon of cyclic stagnation and rebirth in the formation of naval and maritime strategy 
is evident in a period that receives little attention from contemporary strategists. Between the 
War of 1812 and the beginning of the Civil War, the U.S. Navy reflected the Constitutional 
fundamentals that called for the maintenance of a small navy to protect American interests 
against modest threats on the world stage, and an expansible army based on forts and a militia, 
all of which matched the demands of the Monroe Doctrine. In this remote era, there existed little 
capacity within the Navy for the making of strategy. Instead, issues related to the role and size of 
the U.S. Navy were resolved through discussions between the Secretary of the Navy and 
Congress. Given that there was neither the political will nor the economic and industrial means 
to match the navies of the leading European powers of the antebellum era, there was not much 
interest in doing more than funding a handful of naval vessels to show the U.S. flag along the 
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world’s trade routes. The changes that occurred, for instance, the launch of the Yangtze patrol in 
China in 1854, were not accompanied by a fundamental reassessment of naval strategy.  
 
When war came in the spring of 1861, the United States improvised an emergency fleet suited to 
win protracted war of attrition on a scale unseen in U.S. history. This feat was made easier by the 
fact that the Confederacy lacked both a fleet and the industrial base to create a significant naval 
force. The Confederates cobbled together a fleet commerce raiding cruisers and posed a threat 
briefly to the commercial North East, complicating the Atlantic trade. The Confederate’s strategy 
also entangled Britain and France in the naval war between the North and South, which raised 
the prospect of drawing the European great powers into the Civil War. This seemed to be a real 
possibility at the time as the guerre de course under the Stars and Bars burdened trans-Atlantic 
relations, especially when U.S. Navy ships fought Confederate vessels in European waters. The 
use of commerce raiding by the Confederacy made for good headlines, ruined the U.S. merchant 
fleet and scared the citizens of the Northeast as rumors of Confederate threats circulated among 
ports. But this effort had no enduring strategic effect. The Union response to this Confederate 
threat – a blockade strategy – was highly effective and served as the maritime counterpart to the 
scorched earth campaigns waged against the South by U.S. Grant and Forrest Sherman.  
 
The exigencies of the Civil War transformed the U.S. Navy into a modern fighting force. While 
the Navy met its need for skilled personnel by pressing merchant sailors into service, newfound 
roles for steam and iron, and the growing striking power of artillery allowed the Union at the 
height of the Civil War to catch up and to even briefly to surpass European navies. Advances in 
technology, industry and the emerging need for individuals capable of manning and maintaining 
this new naval hardware heralded the impact of the industrial revolution on the U.S. Navy. The 
new technologies incorporated into warships created a need for shipyards and arsenals along 
with an industrial policy similar to the ones adopted by contemporary European naval powers. 
These irresistible forces created a demand for naval strategy, a demand that outpaced the 
capabilities of the Navy as an institution.  
 
The Civil War effort could not be sustained in peacetime as national priorities returned to 
westward expansion, the imperatives of isolation, and doubts about the wisdom of sustaining a 
peacetime military establishment beyond the size or capability of pre-Civil War levels. By the 
1880s, the U.S. Navy declined from its wartime strength into obsolescence, strategic 
misdirection, and civil military turmoil. The popular mood at the end of the Civil War was one of 
exhaustion and vanished appetite for martial glory. The nation had no overseas colonies that 
demanded defense. Americans did not want to be drawn into Europe’s squabbles and feuds. 
Americans understood that they would never launch a war to conquer another nation so they had 
no appetite to construct a global Navy; after all, the European state system would prevent the rise 
of a universal power that could threaten the new world. All these arguments militated against a 
large navy, which, in any event, had never before existed in peacetime. 
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The Navy reverted to its peacetime habits. It mothballed or scrapped most of its ships. Focus 
returned to maintaining overseas squadron stations as the best way to protect U.S. trade and the 
national interests. Contemplation of strategy was largely confined to the prospect of commerce 
raiding against a possible European enemy. The rise of steam, however, made even this limited 
strategic option problematic because of the inherent high cost of forward deploying the 
steamships of the day. Indeed, discussions of Naval strategy only seemed to exacerbate tensions 
between those who advanced the cause of machine navies and those who resisted this idea not 
only out of thrift, but because they abhorred the role of machines and the way new technologies 
demanded the “integration” of people from a variety of social classes into the Navy. Although 
American interests were gradually becoming more global in nature, debates about Naval strategy 
were inward looking, focusing on incorporating new technologies and changing personnel 
requirements. 
 
American politics in aftermath of the civil war also saw the triumph of political and economic 
interests dead set against free trade, which included opposition to a navy large enough to 
augment and protect such trade. The struggle by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to reorient 
the navy on a sensible basis was suffocated in the political backlash against international 
engagement and trade that accompanied reconstruction. Many believe that no political or 
strategic need existed for a stronger, larger, and offensively oriented navy because the world’s 
oceans formed the best common defense. The life of the navy was further burdened by claims of 
graft, corruption and special interests, made worse by the crisis of the U.S. Grant administration. 
Members of Congress spent their time investigating corruption in the Navy Department rather 
than providing the political consensus and means to advance anything resembling sea power, an 
idea that had yet to be born. All of this was topped off in the course of the 1870s by international 
economic depression. The Navy teetered on the brink of collapse.  
 
The nadir of the 1870s, was punctuated by the rise of American sea power, even before Alfred 
Thayer Mahan gave a name to it with his interpretation of war at sea written in the year 1890. 
The advent of the age of imperialism in the international system, which more or less coincided 
with the closing of the American frontier and with it the consolidation of continental expansion 
in the wake of the Civil War, made Americans think in great-power terms, in which navies 
figured as means of national power. The great powers increasingly used navies to subjugate areas 
of Africa and Asia as part of a general struggle for power on a global scale. The internecine 
squabbling in the U.S. Congress that had precluded reform in the world depression graduated to 
consensus about the need to repair the neglected Navy. Foreign incidents in which American 
citizens and commerce were at risk in Latin America and in the Pacific gave energy to those in 
Congress who had long sought naval reform.  
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Strategic Muddle I: 1919–1941  
The forces of decline and rebirth in U.S. Naval strategy also reveal themselves in the interwar 
period. This period has been described by some observers as a golden age of technological 
innovation, others describe as time of great frustration for naval strategists. The fate of the battle 
fleet cannot be simply reduced to a story about the foresight and wisdom of Plan Orange that 
emerged between 1902 and 1941 or a story about how Franklin Delano Roosevelt willfully 
moved the fleet in 1940 from California to Hawaii without adequate preparation for combat. The 
story of strategy during this period is less about carefully executed war games, and more about 
the character of the international system in the first decades of the 20th century, domestic antiwar 
sentiment and parsimony and the disjointed nature of army and navy strategy in the Pacific.  
 
The record of these issues is more politically complicated and organizationally ambiguous than 
widely celebrated legend and enduring Mahanian dogma would have it. For most of this period, 
the Atlantic world and its international political economy held the attention of American 
diplomacy and policy, which with the onset of the world depression became isolationist and 
politically accepting of anti-war principles. Imperial Japan only emerged as a focus of diplomacy 
and statecraft in the late 1930s, when U.S. interest in an anti-Japanese strategy accorded with 
domestic and international reality. In the years between 1919 and 1935, Imperial Japan took a 
backseat in U.S. statecraft behind concerns about the fate of Britain or Germany. There was little 
domestic political agreement over an appropriate response to the growing Japanese threat in the 
Pacific during most of the interwar period.  
 
U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific in the interwar period also suffered from a series of policy and 
strategy mismatches created by several developments in international and domestic politics. 
These impasses and dead ends included the Republican retreat from world power to normalcy in 
the 1920s, the U.S. Navy’s unrealistic and unsustainable fantasies about overtaking the Royal 
Navy in the number of capital ships deployed following the extension of the 1916 ship-building 
program and the evaporation of international cooperation in the years after 1919.  
 
All of this was made worse by a weak League of Nations that emerged in the wake of the war, 
especially following the U.S. Senate’s decision to abandon the League. The Washington Naval 
Treaty of 1922 as well as the enduring problems of the international system (the lack of common 
cause by the victors and the emergence of national rivalries, especially between United States 
and Japan over the fate of China) created significant strategic problems for U.S. Navy. Naval 
strategists had a difficult time discerning whether to prepare for naval rivalry with Britain and its 
Japanese ally or to instead focus on Japan as the enemy. U.S. maritime strategy eventually 
identified Japan as a likely foe by the end of the 1920s. Nevertheless, this center of effort 
followed neither national policy, which was pacifist, abolitionist and commercially oriented, nor 
a domestic political consensus, which was seized of normalcy and a horror of war. This strategic 
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choice was not supported by a budget that would make this preferred Naval strategy completely 
viable against a rising Japan.  
 
Although the story of interwar naval strategy is often depicted as the fight over technology 
between battleship conservatives and aircraft revolutionaries, the anti-war stance of the Harding, 
Coolidge, and Hoover administrations, largely made these debates academic. The domestic 
politics of normalcy, austerity and pacifism, which became more acute once FDR became 
president, made the Navy an afterthought in domestic politics. Isolationism became the order of 
the day in the face of chaos in Asia and Europe. FDR’s decision at the end of the 1930s to 
undertake a massive build up the U.S. Navy in the face of Japanese aggression hardly ended inter 
service rivalry about a blue ocean Pacific strategy until months before Pearl Harbor when the 
Plan Dog and “Germany first” decision was made by the British and American governments. 
The lessons of Pearl Harbor also imposed a burden on the making of strategy at sea, which 
became manifest in the 24 months after the unconditional Japanese surrender on 2 September 
1945.  
 
Strategic Muddle II: 1946–1960 
The Second World War brought the U.S. Navy to the pinnacle of sea power and world 
prominence, but such good fortune could not endure; the pattern of demobilization swiftly 
reappeared amid postwar strategic confusion. With the victories in Europe and in Japan, national 
and Congressional focus returned to the lessons of Pearl Harbor as well as to the dictates of 
economy and peace, which, in turn, portended problems for the making of maritime strategy and 
the role of the Navy in the atomic age. The way World War II unfolded in the Atlantic and the 
Pacific had seemed to give validation to Mahan and his acolytes. But post-war strategy was up 
for grabs. Wartime inter-service bickering over combined and joint operations drove deep 
divisions between the Army and the Navy. Debate over an emerging need for an “air atomic 
strategy” revived the strategic and operational outlook of Giullo Douhet and Billy Mitchell. 
Dogmatic recitation of early–20th-century navalism, based on the assumption that the United 
States had to maintain a ”second-to-none fleet,” was greeted with skepticism by a postwar 
Congress. The search for an affordable peacetime military posture made the lessons of Pearl 
Harbor more onerous for the Navy in the Presidential and Congressional priorities of 1946.  
 
The Bikini Atoll atomic bomb test explosions of 1946 seemed to validate the position of air 
power champions, who had prophesied the obsolescence of capital ships. The concentration of 
naval forces in a future war, as, say, in the English Channel at Normandy or at the Ulithi Atoll 
anchorage in the Western Pacific during World War II, would become unfeasible under atomic 
assault from the air.  
 
To make matters worse, as they cleared the world’s oceans of all adversaries at the height of war, 
Navy leaders apparently failed to consider the looming postwar future. The Navy’s sister 
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services were less circumspect. Army revolutionaries had begun to prepare to carry out 
Mitchell’s idea of an independent Air Force and a single defense department, ending the 
bifurcation of the U.S. defense establishment between a Department of War and a Department of 
the Navy. This bifurcation was portrayed by Air Force advocates as a key contributor to the 
catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. With the aid of Walt Disney and the newsreels, the Air Force had 
also fashioned a “strategic communication campaign” vastly superior to the newsreels that 
highlighted the Navy’s contribution in defeating Germany and Japan. In their view, the “new” 
Air Force would be the key to America’s future defense, not the Navy. 
 
The domestic political austerity and renewed inter-service rivalry that occurred during the battle 
over service unification brought new organizational miseries to the Navy, whose very existence 
was called into question by advocates of air power, by Congressional cost-cutters, and by those 
in the Army incensed over joint operational problems with the USMC in the Pacific campaigns. 
The nadir of maritime strategy and the role of the U.S. Navy in national defense arrived with the 
Congressional unification fight that occurred between 1946 and 1949, an episode that was 
portrayed by a new generation of young critics, fresh from the war, as righting of the wrongs of 
Pearl Harbor. They also made much of the “guilt of the Admirals,” as it was called, who had 
ignored the role of aviation before the late 1930s and who had neglected the nation’s defenses 
because of Mahanian dogma that no longer fit in the air atomic age.  
 
The leadership of the Navy in 1946—especially leading figures in naval aviation—feared that 
the new Air Force would sweep up its aircraft and that the Army would absorb the Marine Corps. 
This fear led to greater partisanship and civil-military insurgency among senior naval aviators in 
the midst of the legislative reforms of service unification and the creation of the Department of 
Defense. This battle over the future of ships and planes blinded these men to the realities and 
requirements of strategy in the pivotal period between the end of the World War II and the 
Korean War. 
 
Now almost forgotten in the 21st century, this epoch of dramatic change and institutional 
adjustment thrust Navy Secretary James Forrestal to prominence. As a kind of reincarnation of 
Mahan, Forrestal became the leading naval strategist of his time, supported in turn by such men 
as Forrest Sherman, who, together with Lauris Norstad, had been crucial in the creation of the 
Defense Department and a comprehensive approach to strategy, which quickly fell apart in the 
face of budgetary restrictions that worsened service parochialism. Forrestal had to fight to 
preserve the independence of the Navy while forcing its adjustment to the nuclear age.  
 
In the opening encounters of the Cold War in southern Europe and the Persian Gulf of 1946, the 
Navy played a vital role by showing the flag at hot spots under Soviet pressure. Fateful for the 
formation of strategy, however, was the brutal demobilization and shrinkage of the fleet. 
Forrestal’s anti-Soviet attitude and his sponsorship of George Kennan’s containment strategy 
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little compensated for the political primacy of the long-range bomber, the guided missile, and the 
atomic weapon. The shift from total war to peace and retrenchment amid service unification led 
to Forrestal’s suicide in 1949, a grim prelude to the inter-service fight over the strategic bomber 
and decisions about which service would deliver the growing U.S. nuclear arsenal to targets in 
the Soviet Union.  
 
Civil-military turmoil and technological upheaval led the advocates of capital ships and aircraft 
to attempt a coup de main against the idea of air power in the atomic age and its intercontinental 
long-range bombers. The aviator admirals sortied in 1949 with the supercarrier, the USS 
America, as the centerpiece of a civil-military revolt against the Harry S. Truman administration 
and its drive for service unification. This public relations and legislative gambit against Curtis 
LeMay and the new Strategic Air Command formed the main focus of Navy strategy until the 
outbreak of the Korean War.  
 
The decisive encounter in the battle over service unification became known as the Revolt of the 
Admirals, a berserk approach to the making of naval strategy. The Navy lost this initial 
legislative fight about strategy, ships and weapons. Fortune quickly ameliorated this defeat, 
however, when the Korean War made possible the increase in air, land and sea forces as set forth 
in March 1950 by NSC 68. The Korean War forced Truman to overlook the services’ incapacity 
to formulate a coherent strategy and to launch a massive post-World War II military buildup.  
 
The advent of the policy of “massive retaliation” in the years after 1953 gave the U.S. Navy an 
important opening to compete again for the much prized nuclear delivery mission. The slow 
development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles helped Arleigh Burke revive naval strategy. 
His strategic realism as well as his bureaucratic acumen remain exemplary. The Korean War had 
shown the renewed importance of maritime operations at Inchon, naval strike aviation and sea 
control. The large aircraft carrier rose from the grave, the size of nuclear weapons shrank, and 
new jet aircraft emerged to carry such ordnance from the Navy’s flight decks. The requirement to 
wage conventional war against the North Koreans and the Chinese banished the nightmare image 
of U.S. capital ships under nuclear attack, and gave the Navy a new lease on life. Massive 
retaliation emerged as a way to deter the Soviets without massive investments in Army 
manpower. 
 
Massive retaliation contained its own contradictions, which immediately became apparent in the 
later course of the 1950s in crises in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Such conflicts 
seemed to call for the limited use of armed forces for the missions of forward defense and crisis 
management, which allowed Army and Navy strategists to propose alternate strategic concepts at 
the expense of the Air Force. The new proposals -- Maxwell Taylor’s flexible response and 
Arleigh Burke’s limited deterrence --- were also more in accord with domestic political realities 
and Soviet threats. These strategic ideas took hold as the United States began to introduce its first 
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intercontinental ballistic missiles and as Hyman Rickover perfected nuclear propulsion in 
submarines and as centralized operational planning for the use of nuclear weapons in crisis and 
war—the SIOP – became a reality.  
 
These steps enabled the Navy to break the Air Force’s decade long nuclear monopoly of the 
nuclear delivery mission by giving the fleet a weapon that could compete with the strategic 
bomber: the George Washington class submarine. In the words of Burke, the new submarine 
would enable Americans to live as human beings — not as a nation submerged in bomb shelters. 
Burke fought off the attempt by the Air force to seize operational control of the Polaris 
submarine under the guise of a Single Integrated Operational Plan, although he was unable to 
prevent Air Force personnel from participating in the selection of the targets of submarine 
launched ballistic missiles. Burke’s effort helped the Navy solidify its role as part of the “triad” 
of forces given the nuclear deterrence mission, an outcome that appeared highly in doubt at the 
outbreak of the Korean War. These ballistic missile submarines gave life to the idea of limited 
deterrence as an option for nuclear strategy and reinforced the role of the Navy in U.S. security 
policy at the start of the 1960s.  
 
The Hollow Force: 1970-1980 
The fourth epoch of decline and rebirth—marked by the so-called hollow force, of the post-
Vietnam and pre-Reagan Navy—is perhaps most easily recognizable from the perspective of 
2015. As America’s involvement in Southeast Asia began to wind down, Navy leaders 
confronted a new political and strategic setting: the Cold War now witnessed a new Soviet global 
assertiveness; new problems emerged in the making of Service strategy following the Vietnam 
debacle; and the economic concerns loomed large in domestic politics. These issues helped to 
detach maritime strategy from national policy and strategy, while, organizational disputes within 
the Navy slowed the adjustment to post-Vietnam strategic realities.  
 
The sad story of the nearly derelict Navy that preceded the Reagan defense buildup and the 
Lehman era of reform comprised the funk of the post-Vietnam retrenchment, the stagflation 
wrought of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises amid war and revolution in the Middle East, too few 
ships, and a return to strategic aimlessness in the Navy’s evolution. What limited national 
attention focused on defense concerned itself with the strategic nuclear balance, or “extending 
deterrence” to the forward defense of Western Europe. Navy leaders faced hard choices because 
of the rapid decline in the defense budget as U.S involvement in Vietnam ended.  
 
Soviet ships, meanwhile, grew in number and undertook a more aggressive operational posture 
each year. The hammer and sickle streamed above sleek new Soviet vessels in such places of the 
former Pax Britannica as Port Said, the coast of East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Admiral 
Gorshkov’s rising challenge to U.S. sea power began well before the 1970s, but the rise of Soviet 
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might afloat became inescapable following Soviet naval movements during the October 1973 
Middle East War. By contrast, the ships and planes of the U.S. fleet, which shrank in number due 
to the budgetary demands of the Vietnam war, grew ever more aged in the course of this 
unhappy decade. This decline was in fact exacerbated by the budget rigors of the middle- and 
late 1970s and stagflation. The cost of modern capital ships and aircraft soared at the very 
moment when the Soviets seemed ready to engage in a major naval arms race.  
 
The long episode of stalemated fighting in Southeast Asia and associated frustrations within 
American society also reverberated on board with racial conflict and a collapse of command and 
obedience. The same problems of command and discipline that wracked the Army in the matter 
of race relations and good order generally hardly vanished once the war ended in 1973. The 
reforms enacted by Elmo Zumwalt in the 1970s remedied many of these problems, but the 
newest version of the interwar “gun club”—the attack carrier admirals in the school of Arthur 
Radford—loathed Zumwalt and decried most of the national strategic decisions that unfolded 
during the rest of the decade to the harm of a capital ship Navy with an offensive strategy.  
 
This friction became highly public in the Pentagon and the halls of Congress in the late 1970s. 
As a result, the Navy’s needs were discounted by those who wrote the budget in an epoch of 
austerity and stagnation. This internal discord about naval strategy contrasted to the more or less 
unified purpose found in the post-Vietnam U.S. Army, which embraced the all-volunteer force 
and modernization of the force to fight and win a Soviet onslaught in Central Europe. The Army 
benefited from the decision to modernize conventional forces in NATO amid the strategic 
assumption that the nuclear threshold had to be raised. The belief that any all-out war in the 
1970s would be short and sharp, also worked against they Navy. Few believed that a 
confrontation along the Central Front would stalemate in a long war of attrition that would give 
the Navy an opportunity to alter the course of a land war through and extended campaign at sea. 
To many, the Navy would be relegated to convoy duty in a future war with the Soviets.  
By the time this lost decade slid to its low points in1979, which were punctuated by the Iranian 
hostage crisis, the Desert One disaster and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Navy leaders had 
made the grave error of viewing maritime strategy as nothing more than a chart of red and blue 
ship diagrams arrayed against one other on the seven seas. That is, strategy was nothing more 
than force structure and weapons, which, in this case, the authors of naval strategy assumed 
would be governed by the vagaries of civil-military relations.  
 
The year 1979 witnessed an acute disassociation of means and ends and of the aims of the naval 
leadership from national policy. Preservation of the carrier construction program became the be 
all and end all of Navy strategy. The Navy was becoming disconnected from national policy by 
pushing what appeared to many to be unaffordable weapons, while turning a blind eye to the lack 
of interest in the body politic that in earlier times had taken a keen interest in sea power and 
supported the idea and the strategy in American democracy.  
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Conclusion 
It would take a new President and a new Secretary of the Navy to re-integrate Navy strategy into 
national strategy. Nevertheless, as this brief survey demonstrates, the fortunes of the Navy, to say 
nothing of Naval strategy, are cyclical. In a sense, changes in the diplomatic, political, economic, 
and even technological setting outpace the ability of the Navy to adjust to new strategic 
landscapes. The real irony is that just as the Navy often reaches some pinnacle of operational or 
technological supremacy, something changes in the external environment to render this 
supremacy superfluous, Naval officers are then forced to scramble to adjust to new strategic 
realities, leaving behind preferred strategies and force structures constructed at enormous human 
effort and great cost. When it comes to Navies, planning cycles are indeed long; changes of 
course rarely occur before crises force a fundamental reassessment of organizational preferences. 
 
There are successes in each of these cycles. These successes were created by visionaries who 
championed new technologies and operations at the expense of Navy organizational culture and 
preferences. The fact that the Navy already possessed the aircraft carrier, the successor to the 
capital ship of the day, before the battleship was rendered virtually obsolete is an observation 
that should give contemporary strategists pause. Contemporary strategists would also do well to 
consider that an inability to link force structure to emerging political, economic and military 
developments was at the heart of all of the crises surveyed in this paper. Admittedly, changes in 
force structure followed each of these crises, but changes in strategic outlook were necessary 
before officers could find away to link Navy strategy to national preferences and objectives. The 
trick for strategists today would be to anticipate our changing strategic landscape so that Naval 
strategy, and a more slowly changing Navy force structure, can keep pace with emerging threats 
and national strategy.  
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Takeaways and Preliminary Recommendations     
A Way Forward: The Navy Strategic Enterprise 
Goal: Greater “fidelity and synergy” in “developing, engaging, and assessing Navy strategy.” 
Elements: 
• Series of meetings create forums for discussion among stakeholders 
– Senior Executive Group (3- and 4-star) to meet quarterly. Co-chaired by N3/5B 
and PNWC 
– Strategy Oversight Group (1- and 2-star, SES) to meet monthly. Chaired by N51. 
– Three Action Officer Groups (O-5/6 or civ equivalent) 
• Strategy subspecialty code improves talent pool 
– Received through education or relevant experience 
– Approx. 70 URL billets designated; officers will remain due-course 
• Development of NKSIL (Navy Key Strategic Issues List) 
• Mentoring program 
We strongly recommend this initiative be resourced appropriately and given highest priority. 
Improved educational opportunities, more coherent manning of billets, and better coordination 
across the Navy and OPNAV is the best way to fix structural problems.  The Navy Strategic 
Enterprise Initiative is clearly a vehicle to accomplish this recommendation and is making 
progress along several of these elements. 
 
Recommendation 1: Codify PPBE Planning Process 
• Codify and publish OPNAV planning guidance, signed by CNO or SECNAV 
• Narrow the scope of N51 planning guidance  
– Prioritize based on strategy and senior leadership policy priorities 
– Focus only on the top 5-10 areas where no additional risk can be assumed and 5-
10 areas where the Navy can reduce potentially legacy capabilities – and prioritize 
within these areas 
– Plans must be cost-conscious 
• Mandate the release of cost-informed planning priorities before N81’s Front-End 
Assessment process kicks off 
• More coherent N51 planning guidance will:  
– Link policy and strategy to outputs 
– Enable measurable policy influence on the POM build 
 
Recommendation 2: Improve Planning-Programming Coherence 
• Use Naval Strategic Enterprise Action Office Groups to improve communication with 
N81 and N80 and to gather input for  planning guidance development 
• N51 needs to maintain an active role in the PPBE process throughout the POM after 
planning priorities have been released  
• Formalize an N51 O-6 position to advocate for strategic guidance and 
maintain N51’s input throughout the POM cycle 
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• N51 must continuously review planning assumptions and financial cost 
projections to ensure any  modifications are expressed in N8’s programs 
• After POM build is complete, conduct assessment on degree to which planning priorities 
were integrated  
• N3/N5 to provide costed policy priorities to the  N8 and N9I in the creation of 30 Year 
Shipbuilding and Aviation Plans 
• Use Navy Strategic Enterprise Initiative to gather “new thinking” into planning process 
 
Recommendation 3: Resolve Human Capital Issues 
Within N51: 
• Mandate the end of 1-down filling of billets in N51 
– Unlike N80 and N81, N51’s staff is heavily skewed toward junior officers; a 
distribution of capabilities that must be reviewed with the objective of creating 
greater balance between the two directorates 
• Improve talent management within N51 
– Newly-created Strategy subspecialty-coded officers must be tracked and 
recapitalized by N51 itself – N51 cannot rely on BUPERS to do this 
Within Navy Strategy Community: 
• The Naval War College, particularly the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS); 
Center for Naval Analyses; and the Naval Postgraduate School can offer N51 institutional 
memory and outside input into strategic planning and strategy development. 
• The NKSIL, sponsored studies, and NPS/NWC strategy students should be used to seek 
answers to questions N51 does not have the bandwidth to address. 
 
Recommendation 4: Codify Strategy Development Process 
• Determine best practices from previous efforts to develop high-level strategies, 
particularly recently-concluded CS21 effort. 
• Develop roadmap for future strategy development efforts based on a sound, structured 
approach to thinking about the future geopolitical, security, and economic environment. 
• Implement intellectually rigorous, ongoing effort to monitor strategic environment to 
determine when current, published strategy should be revisited. 
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Appendix A: Research Team Member Biographies   
James A. Russell serves as Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs 
at NPS, where he is teaching courses on Middle East security affairs, US foreign policy, and 
national security strategy. His articles and commentaries have appeared in a wide variety of 
media and scholarly outlets around the world. His latest articles are, “Nuclear Reductions and 
Middle East Stability: Assessing the Impact of a Smaller Nuclear Arsenal,” Nonproliferation 
Review 20, No. 2 (July 2013) and “Counterinsurgency American Style: Considering David 
Petraeus and 21st Century Irregular War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, No. 1 (January 
2014). His latest books are Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2013), co-edited with Theo Farrell and Frans Osinga and Innovation Transformation and 
War: US Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011). From 1988-2001, Mr. Russell held a variety of positions 
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East 
South Asia, Department of Defense. During this period he traveled extensively in the Persian 
Gulf and Middle East working on U.S. security policy. He holds a Master’s in Public and 
International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh and a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s 
College, the University of London. 
James J. Wirtz is Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, and Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and 
Policies and section chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. He joined the Naval Postgraduate School in 1990 after teaching at Franklin & Marshall College, Penn State University, and the State University of New York, Binghamton Between January 2000 and January 2005 he served as the Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs. He is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association. In 2005 he was a Visiting Professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. His work on intelligence, deterrence, the Vietnam war and military innovation and strategy has been published in Air Power Journal, Annual Review of Political Science, Comparative 
Strategy, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, Harvard International Review, 
Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, International Security, International Studies Notes, Joint Forces 
Quarterly, National Security Studies Quarterly, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, SAIS Review, 
Security Studies, Strategic Review, Strategic Survey, Studies in Intelligence, The 
NonproliferationReview, Terrorism and Political Violence, and The Journal of Strategic 
Studies. He teaches courses on nuclear strategy, international relations theory, and intelligence. Dean Wirtz is currently working on a monograph, entitled Theory of Surprise and edited volumes on complex deterrence, intelligence for homeland security, and the future of proliferation. A native of New Jersey, Dean Wirtz earned his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University (MPhil 1987, PhD 1989), and the University of Delaware (MA 1983, BA 1980). In 1985-86 he was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.  
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Donald Abenheim joined the NPS faculty in 1985. He is Academic Associate for Strategic 
Studies and an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs. Since 1987, he has been a 
visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where he received his Ph.D. in 
European history in 1985. He helped to create the Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) in 
1993, and led its successful Expanded International Education and Training (E-IMET) European 
programs until 2000. He presently represents CCMR to the Consortium of NATO and 
Partnership for Peace Defense Academies. From 1994 until 2000, he organized seminars in the 
civil-military relations of NATO Enlargement at HQ, NATO, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Austria and Georgia. The author of the monograph, Reforging the 
Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the German Armed Forces (Princeton, 1988), his most 
recent publications have appeared in the Oxford Companion to Military History (2000) (NATO 
and German military history) as well as in Orbis (Vol. 46, 1, Winter 2002) and the Hoover 
Institution Digest (Winter/Spring, 2003) on the evolution of NATO policy and strategy from a 
historical perspective. Prior to his role in the advent of CCMR, he consulted with the strategic 
directorates of the army and navy staffs, as well as with the Office of Net Assessment. He 
lectures widely in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and has been interviewed by such 
international media as the International Herald Tribune, Die Zeit, and the Los Angeles Times on 
questions of contemporary policy and strategy. Before the completion of his doctoral studies in 
1985, he was a civilian staff member of U.S. Army, Europe as a liaison to the Bundeswehr in 
alliance burden sharing; an archivist at the Hoover Institution on Germany in the 20th century; 
and a museum curator at the Presidio of San Francisco on the U.S. Army in the 19th and 20th 
centuries and military regalia.  
 
CAPT (ret.) Jeffrey Kline served as a U.S. Naval officer for twenty six years. In his career he 
commanded two ships, served as a naval analyst on the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, 
and had various fleet tours. His graduate degrees are from the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Operations Research (with honors), and the National War College in National Security Strategy 
(Distinguished Graduate.) Jeff is currently a Professor of Practice in the Operations Research 
department. Jeff supports applied analytical research in maritime operations and security, theater 
ballistic missile defense, and future force composition studies. He has severed on several Naval 
Study Board Committees. His NPS faculty awards include the 2011 Institute for Operations 
Research and Management Science (INFORMS) Award for Teaching of OR Practice, 2009 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Homeland Security Award, 2007 Hamming 
Award for interdisciplinary research, 2007 Wayne E. Meyers Award for Excellence in Systems 
Engineering Research, and the 2005 Northrop Grumman Award for Excellence in Systems 
Engineering.  
Christopher P. Twomey joined the faculty of the Department of National Security Affairs as an 
Assistant Professor in November 2004 and was granted tenure and promoted to Associate 
Professor in July 2011. He served as Associate Chair for Research in the department and as 
Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict from 2007-09. In March 2010 he was named 
Research Fellow with the National Asia Research Program at the National Bureau of Asian 
Research. He previously spent two years as an Adjunct Assistant Professor and Instructor in the 
Political Science Department at Boston College (2003-04). He received his Ph.D. in Political 
Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He earned a Master's degree from the 
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, 
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San Diego (UCSD) in 1993. He received his B.A. from UCSD in Economics in 1990. His 
research interests center on security studies, Chinese foreign policy, modern nuclear affairs, 
strategic culture, statecraft, and East Asian security in theory and practice. His book entitled The 
Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations was 
published by Cornell University Press in 2010. It explains how differing military doctrines make 
diplomatic signaling, interpretations of those signals, and assessments of the balance of power 
more difficult. It then tests this explanation through examination of several deterrent attempts 
between China and the United States in the early Cold War and shorter cases drawn from the 
Middle East conflicts in the mid-Cold War. His edited volume entitled Perspectives on Sino-
American Strategic Nuclear Issues (Palgrave Macmillan) was published in 2008, and he co-
edited Power and Prosperity: The Links between Economics and Security in Asia-Pacific 
(Transaction/Rutgers University Press) in 1996. Among his recent articles are: “Asia’s Complex 
Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” Asia Policy, 11 (January 
2011): 51-78; “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism,” Arms Control Today, 
vol. 39, no. 1 (January/February 2009); and "Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International 
Security," Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 2 (Aug 2008).  
Diana Wueger is a research associate with the Center on Contemporary Conflict at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, where she has worked on a range of sponsored research projects related to 
strategic stability, nuclear and naval strategy, limited war, US-Russian relations, and South Asian 
security and deterrence dynamics. She has recently completed her Master’s degree in National 
Security Affairs, with a curricular focus in Strategic Studies. Her Master’s thesis examined the 
theoretical foundations of sea-based deterrence with an eye toward understanding the regional 
security implications of India’s efforts to develop a ballistic missile submarine fleet. In addition 
to her work at NPS, Diana has written on a range of international security and small arms issues 
for numerous publications, both print and online, including Democracy Journal, The 
Atlantic, United Nations Dispatch, and Aviation Week: Defense Technology Edition. Prior to 
joining NPS, Diana worked in Washington, DC for the Brookings Institution and the Center for 
the Study of Services in institutional and business development. She is a graduate of Oberlin 
College, where she earned High Honors in Politics for her thesis on small arms proliferation 
dynamics after the Cold War.  
 
Thomas-Durell Young is the Program Manager for the Europe Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also Academic Associate for the 
Comparative Defense Planning Certificate in the Department of National Security Affairs. His 
responsibilities at CCMR are to develop and manage the execution of defense planning and 
management assistance projects throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the key reform 
projects he has managed include the oversight of comprehensive defense planning reform 
projects in Estonia (2000-2002), Ukraine (2003-present), Moldova (2004-2008), Bulgaria (2008-
2011), Serbia (2010-present), and Montenegro (2011-present). He developed and executed the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Institution Building survey and road-map 
development process from 2008-2010. From spring 2010 to the end of 2011, Dr. Young lead a 
major effort to support Bulgarian Defense Minister Anyu Angelov in the conduct of a far-
reaching Bulgarian Force Structure Review that sought to transform the defense organization 
into one that is in full accordance with NATO nations’ norms. Dr. Young also holds the position 
of Staff Consultant at the RAND Corporation (Santa Monica) where he assesses defense 
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planning and management issues. Prior to taking these positions in March 2000, he was a 
Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for 12 years, 
where he was responsible for producing analyses of European politico-military issues, as well as 
joint planning, execution, and management systems and procedures for the Army and Joint 
Staffs. In 1999, he was the inaugural Eisenhower Fellow at the Royal Netherlands Military 
Academy, Breda, the Netherlands. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. and Certificat des Etudes 
supérieurs in international economics and policy from the Institut univérsitaire de Hautes Etudes 
internationales, Université de Genève (Geneva, Switzerland). He is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. 
Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA) and holds an M.A. with Great Distinction from the 
School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University (Bologna / Washington, 
DC). He has authored / co-authored 5 books and monographs and over 100 book chapters, 
articles and book reviews, to include NATO after 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, 
(Praeger, 2001), co-authored with the late-John Borawski. Since 1989, he has been the North 
American editor of Small Wars and Insurgencies (London) and is on the editorial boards of the 
PfP Consortium’s Connections, and Defense and Security Analysis (Lancaster, UK).  He is a 




LT Benjiman D. Coyle is currently an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School in 
Newport, RI. Raised in Reno, Nevada, LT Coyle graduated from the University of Nevada in 
2005 with a BA in Criminal Justice. In 2008, he earned a commission from OCS. His first tour 
was aboard USS PREBLE (DDG 88), where he served as the Strike Officer. His second tour was 
on USS GRIDLEY (DDG 101) as the damage control assistant. Following two successful sea 
tours, he attended the Naval Postgraduate School, where he earned a Master’s Degree in 
Strategic Studies and completed JPME Phase 1.  
 
LTJG Barry Scott is enrolled at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA for a Master’s 
degree in Strategic Studies, and is currently serving as a Director Fellow in the Chief of Naval 
Operations’ Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. He enlisted in the 
Navy in 2005 and joined Naval Special Warfare. In 2010, he earned a commission from Officer 
Candidate School in Newport, RI. LTJG Scott has deployed twice in support of OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM, and served in special projects for the State Department. LTJG Scott 
was born in Hillsboro, OR. He earned a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the 
University of Oregon in 2000, and attended the Executive Program in Strategy & Organization at 
Stanford University in 2012.  
 
